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INFORMED CONSENT - MUST IT REMAIN A
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Jay Katz, M.D.**
When the editors of the Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Pol-
icy asked me to contribute an article to their issue in honor of my friend,
colleague and dean, Guido Calabresi, I accepted their invitation with
pleasure. Since I had reflected about informed consent for two decades, I
welcomed this opportunity to set forth my final thoughts and conclusions,
however briefly and summarily, on this doctrine and its impact on physi-
cian-patient decisionmaking. This essay gives a good account of what I
shall ever be able to say about informed consent.
It is appropriate that I choose this topic for this occasion because
Guido has had a long standing interest in law and medicine. Twenty-five
years ago, he published his remarkable paper, Reflections on Medical Ex-
perimentation in Humans,1 and since then he has periodically written on
issues in law and medicine. He has not, however, ever explored in depth
the problematics of the legal doctrine of informed consent and, to the
extent he has, only in the contexts of human experimentation and organ
transplantation. If this essay will stimulate this great torts law scholar and
teacher to give us his analysis and insights, we can only benefit from his
wisdom.
In his article on human experimentation, Guido was mainly concerned
with one crucial tension inherent in medical research: "our fundamental
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need constantly to reaffirm our belief in the sanctity of life and our practi-
cal placing of some values (including future lives) above an individual
life."2 He admonished scholars to "devot[e] themselves to the develop-
ment of a workable but not too obvious control system, rather than to the
spinning-out of theories of consent,"3 because "[t]otally free consent is
simply too rare an animal."4 While I assign greater significance to con-
sent as a mechanism of control than Guido does, I agree with him that
"consent by itself is not enough."5
Informed consent is a hybrid concept which speaks both to physicians'
disclosure obligations and patients' willingness to undergo a particular
treatment. Throughout this essay I intend to give prominence to the dis-
closure aspect of informed consent and its implications for improving the
quality of patient consent. I would go further than Guido did, when he
wrote that "some form of consent should always be required,",6 because I
have greater faith in the crucial role that consent can play in doctor-pa-
tient decisionmaking once physicians learn to differentiate, which they
have not, between acquiescence and consent. I shall have more to say
about all this as I go along. In his recent, intriguing article, Do We Own
Our Bodies?, while addressing problems of organ transplantation, Guido
comes close to issues that I shall explore in this essay:
I admit I am still an individualistic Kantian libertarian... I find
it very hard to conceive of a situation in which the state should
properly say: "Guido, you must give up that magnificent hair,
blood, or marrow, to someone else regardless of your will.....
We owe it to' ourselves.., to do more thinking about something
which seems, at first glance, outlandish - like the question: Do
we own our own bodies?" 7
Guido raised his "outlandish" question with respect to state-mandated
interventions. How might he answer the question, "Do we own our own
bodies?" in the context of the physician-patient relationship? I shall ar-
gue that physicians take too much license with patients' bodies and that
the common law doctrine of informed consent has insufficiently ad-
dressed the question of who owns our bodies. In a different vein, Guido
speaks to this question in Ideals, Beliefs, Attitudes, and the Law:
2. Id. at 405.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 391.
5. Id. at 404.
6. Id. (emphasis added).
7. Guido Calabresi, Do We Own Our Bodies?, 1 HEALTH MATRIX 17-18 (1991).
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Have the lives we have prolonged been, in some sense, fruitful
and rewarding (even if terribly handicapped)? Have we ad-
hered to those beliefs, ideals and attitudes (including the ideal of
letting people hold to their own kooky ideals) which may be
dearer to us than an extra month on a life expectancy table?8
Physicians, as I shall argue later, have always placed greater value on
longevity than on quality of life. To resolve these and other value con-
flicts alone requires searching conversation between physicians and pa-
tients. Without such conversation, informed consent will remain a hollow
aspiration and preclude patients from exercising greater control over de-
cisions which, in the end, only they can make.
Like Guido, though perhaps with modification, I too am "an individu-
alistic Kantian libertarian," and thus I give greater weight to autonomy
and self-determination than perhaps he does. As I observed years ago:
Physicians have always maintained that patients are only in need
of caring custody.... The idea that patients may also be entitled
to liberty, to sharing the burdens of decision with the doctors,
was never [at least until recently] part of the ethos of medicine.
Being unaware of the idea of patient liberty, physicians did not
address the possible conflict between notions of custody and
liberty.9
In this essay I shall also argue that formidable problems exist which
require study and resolution before informed consent can ever safeguard
patient autonomy and self-determination. The likely outcome of such in-
quiries will be to return ownership of bodies to patients and to not allow
caring custody to mislead physicians and patients into believing that own-
ership must temporarily be transferred to doctors' "discretion." Law has
an important role to play here by prodding physicians to be more atten-
tive to patients' rights regarding decisionmaking authority. Such prod-
ding, as I have already suggested, is necessary because the idea that
patients have rights to autonomy and self-determination has been an
alien one throughout the history of medical practice. Ultimately,
medicine and not law must formulate a doctrine of informed consent
which is responsive not only to the proddings of law but also to the reali-
ties of medical practice (i.e., to the complex caretaking and being-taken-
care-of interactions that are the essence of all interactions between pa-
tients and their physicians). Finally, I shall argue, as I have already noted,
that greater emphasis has to be given to disclosure rather than consent
8. GuiDo CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATITUDES, AND THE LAW 10-11 (1985).
9. JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 2 (1984).
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and, therefore, that the inadequacies in current disclosure practices are to
begin with the greater obstacle to fashioning an informed consent doc-
trine which is not a charade.
Guido will soon be a judge on the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit. He, of course, will often return to Yale Law School
and, thus, this essay is not written in the spirit of saying farewell to him
but of expressing my admiration, at a decisive moment in his professional
life, to a wonderful person who over the last thirty-six years has meant so
much to me and to my school. I can give him no better present than my
thoughts on a topic in which we share a common interest. I hope that in
the informed consent cases which will surely come before him, he will
address some of my concerns about the persisting inadequacies in the
physician-patient decisionmaking process.
I. THE PRE-HSTORY OF INFORMED CONSENT IN MEDICINE
The idea that, prior to any medical intervention, physicians must seek
their patients' informed consent was introduced into American law in a
brief paragraph in a 1957 state court decision, 10 and then elaborated on in
a lengthier opinion in 1960." The emerging legal idea that physicians
were from now on obligated to share decisionmaking authority with their
patients shocked the medical community, for it constituted a radical
break with the silence that had been the hallmark of physician-patient
interactions throughout the ages. Thirty-five years are perhaps not long
enough for either law or medicine to resolve the tension between legal
theory and medical practice, particularly since judges were reluctant to
face up to implications of their novel doctrine, preferring instead to re-
main quite deferential to the practices of the medical profession.
Viewed from the perspective of medical history, the doctrine of in-
formed consent, if taken seriously, constitutes a revolutionary break with
customary practice. Thus, I must review, albeit all too briefly, the history
of doctor-patient communication. Only then can one appreciate how un-
prepared the medical profession was to heed these new legal commands.
But there is more: Physicians could not easily reject what law had begun
to impose on them, because they recognized intuitively that the radical
transformation of medicine since the age of medical science made it pos-
sible, indeed imperative, for a doctrine of informed consent to emerge.
10. Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of IYustees, 317 P.2d 170, 181 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1957).
11. Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093 (Kan. 1960).
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Yet, bowing to the doctrine did not mean accepting it. Indeed, physicians
could not accept it because, for reasons I shall soon explore, the nature of
informed consent has remained in the words of Churchill, "an enigma
wrapped in a mystery."
Throughout the ages physicians believed that they should make treat-
ment decisions for their patients. This conviction inheres in the Hippo-
cratic Oath: "I swear by Apollo and Aesculepius [that] I will follow that
system of regimen which according to my ability and judgment I consider
for the benefit of my patients .... ."" The patient is not mentioned as a
person whose ability and judgment deserve consideration. Indeed, in one
of the few references to disclosure in the Hippocratic Corpus, physicians
are admonished "to [conceal] most things from the patient while attend-
ing to him; [to] give necessary orders with cheerfulness and serenity,...
revealing nothing of the patient's future or present condition."13 When
twenty-five centuries later, in 1847, the American Medical Association
promulgated its first Code of Ethics, it equally admonished patients that
their "obedience ... to the prescriptions of [their] physician should be
prompt and implicit. [They] should never permit [their] own crude opin-
ions ... to influence [their] attention to [their physicians].' 4
The gulf separating doctors from patients seemed unbridgeable both
medically and socially. Thus, whenever the Code did not refer to physi-
cians and patients as such, the former were addressed as "gentlemen" and
the latter as "fellow creatures." To be sure, caring for patients' medical
needs and "abstain[ing] from whatever is deleterious and mischievous""
was deeply imbedded in the ethos of Hippocratic medicine. The idea that
patients were also "autonomous" human beings, entitled to being part-
ners in decisionmaking, was, until recently, rarely given recognition in the
lexicon of medical ethics. The notion that human beings possess individ-
ual human rights, deserving of respect, of course, is of recent origin. Yet,
it antedates the twentieth century and therefore could have had an im-
pact on the nature and quality of the physician-patient relationship.
It did not. Instead, the conviction that physicians should decide what is
best for their patients, and, therefore, that the authority and power to do
so should remain vested in them, continued to have a deep hold on the
12. Hippocrates, Oath of Hippocrates, in 1 HIPPOCRATES 299-301 (W.H.S. Jones trans.,
1962).
13. 2 HIPPocRATEs 297 (W.H.S. Jones trans., 1962).
14. American Medical Association: Code of Ethics (1847), reprinted in KATZ, supra
note 9, at 232.
15. Hippocrates, supra note 12, at 301.
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practices of the medical profession. For example, in the early 1950s the
influential Harvard sociologist Talcott Parsons, who echoed physicians'
views, stated that the physician is a technically competent person whose
competence and specific judgments and measures cannot be competently
judged by the layman and that the latter must take doctors' judgments
and measures on 'authority'. 16 The necessity for such authority was sup-
ported by three claims:
First, physicians' esoteric knowledge, acquired in the course of arduous
training and practical experience, cannot be comprehended by patients.
While it is true that this knowledge, in its totality, is difficult to learn,
understand and master, it does not necessarily follow that physicians can-
not translate their esoteric knowledge into language that comports with
patients' experiences and life goals (i.e., into language that speaks to
quality of future life, expressed in words of risks, benefits, alternatives
and uncertainties). Perhaps patients can understand this, but physicians
have had. too little training and experience with, or even more impor-
tantly, a commitment to, communicating their "esoteric knowledge" to
patients in plain language to permit a conclusive answer as to what pa-
tients may comprehend.
Second, patients, because of their anxieties over being ill and consequent
regression to childlike thinking, are incapable of making decisions on their
own behalf. We do not know whether the childlike behavior often dis-
played by patients is triggered by pain, fear, and illness, or by physicians'
authoritarian insistence that good patients comply with doctors' orders,
or by doctors' unwillingness to share information with patients. Without
providing such information, patients are groping in the dark and their
stumbling attempts to ask questions, if made at all, makes them appear
more incapable of understanding than they truly are.
We know all too little about the relative contributions which being ill,
being kept ignorant, or being considered incompetent make to these re-
gressive manifestations. Thus, physicians' unexamined convictions easily
become self-fulfilling prophesies. For example, Eric Cassell has consist-
ently argued that illness robs patients of autonomy and that only subse-
quent to the act of healing is autonomy restored.17 While there is some
truth to these contentions, they overlook the extent to which doctors can
restore autonomy prior to the act of healing by not treating patients as
16. TALCOTT PARSONS, THE SOCIAL SYSTEM 464-65 (1951).
17. Eric Cassell, The Function of Medicine, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Dec. 1977, at 16,
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children but as adults whose capacity for remaining authors of their own
fate can be sustained and nourished. Cassell's views are reminiscent of
Dostoyevsky's Grand Inquisitor who proclaimed that "at the most fearful
moments of life," mankind is in need of "miracle, mystery and author-
ity."18 While, in this modern age, a person's capacity and right to take
responsibility for his or her conduct has been given greater recognition
than the Grand Inquisitor was inclined to grant, it still does not extend to
patients. In the context of illness, physicians are apt to join the Grand
Inquisitor at least to the extent of asserting that, while patients, they can
only be comforted through subjugation to miracle, mystery and authority.
Third, physicians' commitment to altruism is a sufficient safeguard for
preventing abuses of their professional authority. While altruism, as a gen-
eral professional commitment, has served patients well in their en-
counters with physicians, the kind of protection it does and does not
provide has not been examined in any depth. I shall have more to say
about this later on. For now, let me only mention one problem: Altruism
can only promise that doctors will try to place their patients' medical
needs over their own personal needs. Altruism cannot promise that phy-
sicians will know, without inquiry, patients' needs. Put another way, pa-
tients and doctors do not' necessarily have an identity of interest about
matters of health and illness. Of course, both seek restoration of health
and cure, and whenever such ends are readily attainable by only one
route, their interests indeed may coincide.
In many physician-patient encounters, however, cure has many faces
and the means selected affect the nature of cure in decisive ways. Thus,
since quality of life is shaped decisively by available treatment options
(including no treatment), the objectives of health and cure can be pur-
sued in a variety of ways. Consider, for example, differences in value
preferences between doctors and patients about longevity versus quality
of remaining life. Without inquiry, one cannot presume identity of inter-
est. As the surgeon Nuland cogently observed: "A doctor's altruism
notwithstanding, his agenda and value system are not the same as those
of the patient. That is the fallacy in the concept of beneficence so cher-
ished by many physicians."' 9
18. FYODOR DOSTOYEVSKY, THE BROTHERS KARAMAZOV 307 (A.P. MacAndrew
trans., 1970).
19. Interview with Sherwin Nuland (1993).
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II. THE AGE OF MEDICAL SCIENCE AND INFORMED CONSENT
During the millennia of medical history, and until the beginning of the
twentieth century, physicians could not explain to their patients, or -
from the perspective of hindsight - to themselves, which of their treat-
ment recommendations were curative and which were not. To be sure,
doctors, by careful bedside observation, tried their level best "to abstain
from what is deleterious and mischievous," to help if they could, and to
be available for comfort during the hours, days or months of suffering.
Doing more curatively, however, only became possible with the advent of
the age of medical science. The introduction of scientific reasoning into
medicine, aided by the results of carefully conducted research, permitted
doctors for the first time to discriminate more aptly between knowledge,
ignorance and conjecture in their recommendations for or against treat-
ment. Moreover, the spectacular technological advances in the diagnosis
and treatment of disease, spawned by medical science, provided patients
and doctors with ever-increasing therapeutic options, each having its own
particular benefits and risks.
Thus, for the first time in medical history it is possible, even medically
and morally imperative, to give patients a voice in medical decisionmak-
ing. It is possible because knowledge and ignorance can be better speci-
fied; it is medically imperative because a variety of treatments are
available, each of which can bestow great benefits or inflict grievous
harm; it is morally imperative because patients, depending on the lifestyle
they wish to lead during and after treatment, must be given a choice.
All this seems self-evident. Yet, the physician-patient relationship -
the conversations between the two parties - was not altered with the
transformation of medical practice during the twentieth century. Indeed,
the silence only deepened once laboratory data were inscribed in charts
and not in patients' minds, once machines allowed physicians' eyes to
gaze not at patients' faces but at the numbers they displayed, once x-rays
and electrocardiograms began to speak for patients' suffering rather than
their suffering voices.
What captured the medical imagination and found expression in the
education of future physicians, was the promise that before too long the
diagnosis of patients' diseases would yield objective, scientific data to the
point of becoming algorithms. Treatment, however, required subjective
data from patients and would be influenced by doctors' subjective judg-
ments. This fact was overlooked in the quest for objectivity. Also over-
looked was the possibility that greater scientific understanding of the
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nature of disease and its treatment facilitated better communication with
patients. In that respect contemporary Hippocratic practices remained
rooted in the past.
III. THE IMPACT OF LAW
The impetus for change in traditional patterns of communication be-
tween doctors and patients came not from medicine but from law. In a
1957 California case,20 and a 1960 Kansas case,2 ' judges were astounded
and troubled by these undisputed facts: That without any disclosure of
risks, new technologies had been employed which promised great bene-
fits but also exposed patients to formidable and uncontrollable harm. In
the California case, a patient suffered a permanent paralysis of his lower
extremities subsequent to the injection of a dye, sodium urokan, to locate
a block in the abdominal aorta. In the Kansas case, a patient suffered
severe injuries from cobalt radiation, administered, instead of conven-
tional x-ray treatment, subsequent to a mastectomy for breast cancer. In
the latter case, Justice Schroeder attempted to give greater specifications
to the informed consent doctrine, first promulgated in the California deci-
sion: "To disclose and explain to the patient, in language as simple as
necessary, the nature of the ailment, the nature of the proposed treat-
ment, the probability of success or of alternatives, and perhaps the risks
of unfortunate results and unforeseen conditions within the body."
22
From the perspective of improved doctor-patient communication, or
better, shared decisionmaking, the fault lines inherent in this American
legal doctrine are many:
One: The common law judges who promulgated the doctrine restricted
their task to articulating new and more stringent standards of liability
whenever physicians withheld material information that patients should
know, particularly in light of the harm that the spectacular advances in
medical technology could inflict. Thus, the doctrine was limited in scope,
designed to specify those minimal disclosure obligations that physicians
must fulfill to escape legal liability for alleged non-disclosures. Moreover,
it was shaped and confined by legal assumptions about the objectives of
the laws of evidence and negligence, and by economic philosophies as to
20. Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 317 P.2d 170 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1957).
21. Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093 (Kan. 1960).
22. Id. at 1106.
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who should assume the financial burdens for medical injuries sustained
by patients.
Even though the judges based the doctrine on "Anglo-American
law['s] ... premise of thorough-going self-determination,"23 as the Kan-
sas court put it, or on "the root premise ... fundamental in American
jurisprudence that 'every human being of adult years and sound mind has
a right to determine what shall be done with his own body,"'24 as the
Circuit Court for the District of Columbia put it in a subsequent opinion,
the doctrine was grounded not in battery law (trespass), but in negligence
law. The reasons are many. I shall only mention a compelling one: Bat-
tery law, based on unauthorized trespass, gives doctors only one defense
- that they have made adequate disclosure. Negligence law, on the
other hand, permits doctors to invoke many defenses, including "the ther-
apeutic privilege" not to disclose when in their judgment, disclosure may
prove harmful to patients' welfare.
Two recent opinions illustrate the problems identified here. First, in a
rare opinion, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reconfirmed its adher-
ence to the minority view among American jurisdictions that battery, not
negligence, is the appropriate cause of action whenever lack of informed
consent is alleged. The court held that whenever "the patient... demon-
strated, and the jury found, that he was not advised of ... material facts,
risks, complications and alternatives to surgery which a reasonable man
would have considered significant in deciding whether to have the opera-
tion.., the causation inquiry ends. The sole issue remaining [is] a deter-
mination of damages."25 Earlier in its opinion, the court quoted, with
approval, a prior Pennsylvania decision:
[W]here a patient is mentally and physically able to consult
about his condition, in the absence of an emergency, the consent
of the patient is "a prerequisite to a surgical operation by his
physician, and an operation without the patient's consent is a
technical assault."26
Second, the Court of Appeals of California, in a ground-breaking opin-
ion, significantly reduced the scope of the therapeutic privilege by requir-
ing that in instances of hopeless prognosis (the most common situation in
which the privilege has generally been invoked) the patient be provided
23. Id. at 1104.
24. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
25. Gouse v. Cassel, 615 A.2d 331, 335 (Pa. 1992).
26. Id. at 333-34 (emphasis added) (quoting Moscicki v. Shor, 163 A. 341, 342 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1932)).
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with such information by asking, "If not the physician's duty to disclose a
terminal illness, then whose?"'27 The duty to disclose prognosis had never
before been identified specifically as one of the disclosure obligations in
an informed consent opinion.
Thus, the appellate court's ruling constituted an important advance. It
established that patients have a right to make decisions not only about
the fate of their bodies but about the fate of their lives as well. The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court, however, reversed. In doing so, the court made
too much of an issue raised by the plaintiffs that led the appellate court to
hold that doctors must disclose "statistical life expectancy information."2
To be sure, disclosure of statistical information is a complex problem, but
in focusing on that issue, the supreme court's attention was diverted from
a more important new disclosure obligation promulgated by the appellate
court: the duty to inform patients of their dire prognosis. The supreme
court did not comment on that obligation. Indeed, it seemed to reverse
the appellate court on this crucial issue by reinforcing the considerable
leeway granted physicians to invoke the therapeutic privilege exception
to full disclosure: "We decline to intrude further, either on the subtleties
of the physician-patient relationship or in the resolution of claims that the
physician's duty of disclosure was breached, by requiring the disclosure of
information that may or may not be indicated in a given treatment
context.
29
Two: The doctrine of informed consent was not designed to serve as a
medical blueprint for interactions between physicians and patients. The
medical profession still faces the task of fashioning a "doctrine" that com-
ports with its own vision of doctor-patient communication and that is re-
sponsive both to the realities of medical practices in an age of science and
to the commands of law. As I said years ago,
[T]ranslating the ingredients of [the* informed consent] process
into legal and useful medical prescriptions that respect patients'
wishes to maintain and surrender autonomy, as well as physi-
cians' unending struggles with omnipotence and impotence in
the light of medical uncertainty, is a difficult task [which the
medical profession] has not pursued . ... in any depth.3 °
Thus, disclosure practices only changed to the extent of physicians dis-
27. Arato v. Avedon, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 169, 181 n.19 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992), vacated, 858
P.2d 598 (Cal. 1993).
28. Arato, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 177.
29. Arato, 858 P.2d at 607.
30. KATZ, supra note 9, at 84.
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closing more about the risks of a proposed intervention in order to escape
legal liability.
Three: Underlying the legal doctrine there lurks a broader assumption
which has neither been given full recognition by judges nor embraced by
physicians. The underlying idea is this: That from now on patients and
physicians must make decisions jointly, with patients ultimately deciding
whether to accede to doctors' recommendations. In The Cancer Ward,
Solzhenitsyn captured, as only a novelist can, the fears that such an idea
engenders. When doctor Ludmilla Afanasyevna was challenged by her
patient, Oleg Kostoglotov, about physicians' rights to make unilateral de-
cisions on behalf of patients, Afanasyevna gave a troubled, though une-
quivocal, answer: "But doctors are entitled to the right - doctors above
all. Without that right, there'd be no such thing as medicine. "31
If Afanasyevna is correct, then patients must continue to trust doctors
silently. Conversation, to comport with the idea of informed consent, ul-
timately requires that both parties make decisions jointly and that their
views and preferences be treated with respect. Trust, based on blind faith
- on passive surrender to oneself or to another - must be distinguished
from trust that is earned after having first acknowledged to oneself and
then shared with the other what one knows and does not know about the
decision to be made. If all of that had been considered by physicians,
they would have appreciated that a new model of doctor-patient commu-
nication, that takes informed consent seriously required a radical break
with current medical disclosure practice.
Four: The idea of joint decisionmaking is one thing, and its application
in practice another. To translate theory into practice cannot be accom-
plished, as the Judicial Council of the American Medical Association at-
tempted to do in one short paragraph. The Judicial Council stated that
"[t]he patient should make his own determination on treatment. In-
formed consent is a basic social policy .... To translate social policy
into medical policy is an inordinately difficult task. It requires a reassess-
ment of the limits of medical knowledge in the light of medical uncer-
tainty, a reassessment of professional authority to make decisions for
patients in light of the consequences of such conduct for the well-being of
patients, and a reassessment of the limits of patients' capacities to assume
responsibility for choice in the light of their ignorance about medical mat-
31. ALEXANDER SOLZHENITSYN, THE CANCER WARD 77 (N. Bethell & D. Burg trans.,
1969).
32. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE AM. MEDICAL ASS'N, CURRENT OPINIONS OF THE JU-
DICIAL COUNCIL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION 25 (1981) (emphasis added).
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ters and their anxieties when ill. Turning now to these problems, I wish to
highlight that, in the absence of such reassessments, informed consent
will remain a charade, and joint decisionmaking will elude us.
IV. BARRIERS TO JoINT DECISIONMAKING
A. Medical Uncertainty
The longer I reflect about doctor-patient decisionmaking, the more
convinced I am that in this modern age of medical science, which for the
first time permits sharing with patients the uncertainties of diagnosis,
treatment, and prognosis, the problem of uncertainty poses the most for-
midable obstacle to disclosure and consent. By medical uncertainty I
mean to convey what the physician Lewis Thomas observed so elo-
quently, albeit disturbingly:
The only valid piece of scientific truth about which I feel totally
confident is that we are profoundly ignorant about nature.... It
is this sudden confrontation with the depth and scope of igno-
rance that represents the most significant contribution of twenti-
eth-century science to the human intellect. We are, at last facing
up to it. In earlier times, we either pretended to understand...
or ignored the problem, or simply made up stories to fill the
gap.
33
Alvan Feinstein put this in more concrete language: "Clinicians are still
uncertain about the best means of treatment for even such routine
problems as ... a fractured hip, a peptic ulcer, a stroke, a myocardial
infarction .... At a time of potent drugs and formidable surgery, the exact
effects of many therapeutic procedures are dubious or shrouded in
dissension.
34
Medical uncertainty constitutes a formidable obstacle to joint decision-
making for a number of reasons: Sharing uncertainties requires physi-
cians to be more aware of them than they commonly are. They must
learn how to communicate them to patients and they must shed their em-
barrassment over acknowledging the true state of their own and of
medicine's art and science. Thus, sharing uncertainties requires a willing-
ness to admit ignorance about benefits and risks; to acknowledge the
existence of alternatives, each with its own known and unknown conse-
quences; to eschew one single authoritative recommendation; to consider
33. LEWIS THOMAS, THE MEDUSA AND THE SNAIL 73-74 (1979).
34. ALVAN R. FEINSTEIN, CLINICAL JUDGMENT 23-24 (1967). Even though written 27
years ago, he has not changed his views. Interview with Alvan R. Feinstein (1994).
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carefully how to present uncertainty so that patients will not be over-
whelmed by the information they will receive; and to explore the crucial
question of how much uncertainty physicians themselves can tolerate
without compromising their effectiveness as healers.
To so conduct oneself is most difficult. For, once doctors, on the basis
of their clinical experience and knowledge, conclude which treatment is
best, they tend to disregard, if not reject, the view of other colleagues
who treat the same condition differently. Consider the current contro-
versy over the management of localized prostate cancer: surgery, radia-
tion or watchful waiting.35 Some of the physicians involved in the debate
are not even willing to accept that uncertainty exists, or at least they mini-
mize its relevance to choice of treatment. Most who advocate treatment
strongly prefer one type over another based on professional specializa-
tion (radiologists tend to recommend radiation; surgeons surgery).
Moreover, acknowledgement of uncertainty is undermined by the
threat that it will undermine doctors' authority and sense of superiority.
As Nuland put it, to feel superior to those dependent persons who are the
sick, is after all a motivating factor that often influences their choice of
medicine as a profession.36 All of this suggests that implementation of
the idea of informed consent is, to begin with, not a patient problem but a
physician problem.
B. Patient Incompetence
Earlier, I touched on physicians' convictions that illness and medicine's
esoteric knowledge rob patients of the capacity to participate in decision-
making. Yet we do not know whether this is true. The evidence is com-
promised by the groping, half-hearted, and misleading attempts to inform
patients about uncertainty and other matters which can make doctors'
communications so confusing and incomprehensible. If patients then ap-
pear stupid and ignorant this should come as no surprise; nor should pa-
tients' resigned surrender to this dilemma: "You are the doctor, you
decide."
It is equally debatable, as Thomas Duffy has contended, that
"[p]aternalism exists in medicine... to fulfill a need created by illness."37
It led him to argue, echoing Cassell, that "obviously autonomy cannot
35. Gerald W. Chodak et al., Results of Conservative Management of Clinically Local-
ized Prostate Cancer, 330 NEw ENG. J. MED. 242 (1994).
36. Interview with Sherwin B. Nuland (1994).
37. Thomas P. Duffy, Agamemnon's Fate and the Medical Profession, 9 W. NEw ENrg.
L. REv. 21, 27 (1987).
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function as the cornerstone of the doctor-patient relationship [since] the
impact of disease on personal integrity results in the patient's loss of au-
tonomy. . . In the doctor-patient relationship, the medical profession
should always err on the side of beneficence."38 If Duffy is correct, how-
ever, then informed consent is ab initio fatally compromised.
C. Patient Autonomy
Duffy's invocation of beneficence as the guiding principle is deeply
rooted in the history of Hippocratic medicine. It finds expression in the
ancient maxim: primum non nocere, above all do no harm, with "harm"
remaining undefined but in practice being defined only as physical harm.
Before presenting my views on the controversy over the primacy of au-
tonomy or beneficence, let me briefly define their meaning.
In their authoritative book Principles of Biomedical Ethics, Thomas
Beauchamp and James Childress defined these principles:
Autonomy is a form of personal liberty of action where the indi-
vidual determines his or her own course of action in accordance
with a plan chosen by himself or herself. [Respect for individu-
als as autonomous agents entitles them] to such autonomous de-
terminations without limitation on their liberty being imposed
by others.39
Beneficence, on the other hand,
[r]equires not only that we treat persons autonomously and that
we refrain from harming them, but also that we contribute to
their welfare including their health. [Thus the principle asserts]
the duty to help others further their important and legitimate
interests ... to confer benefits and actively to prevent and re-
move harms... [and] to balance possible goods against the pos-
sible harms of an action.'
Beauchamp and Childress' unequivocal and strong postulate on auton-
omy contrasts. with the ambiguities contained in their postulate on benefi-
cence. What do they mean by "benefits" and "harms" that allow
invocation of beneficence? Do they mean only benefits and harms to
patients' physical integrity, or to their dignitary integrity as choice-mak-
ing individuals as well? Furthermore, what degree of discretion and li-
38. Id. at 30.
39. THOMAS L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL
ETHICS 56, 58 (lst ed. 1979).
40. THOMAS L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL
ETHICS 148-49 (2d ed. 1983).
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cense is permissible in the duty "to balance?" I have problems with
balancing unless it is resorted to only as a rare exception to respect for
autonomy. While human life is, and human interactions are, too complex
to make any principle rule absolute, any exceptions must be rigorously
justified.
I appreciate that mine is a radical proposal and constitutes a sharp
break with Hippocratic practices. If informed consent, however, is ever
to be based on the postulate of joint decisionmaking, the obligation "to
respect the autonomous choices and actions of others,"'41 as Childress has
put it, must be honored. Otherwise, informed consent is reduced to doc-
tors providing more information but leaving decisionmaking itself to the
authority of physicians.
As one physician once told me, echoing only an all too prevalent belief
(and he was a physician allegedly deeply committed to informed con-
sent), "I must first make the judgment which treatment alternative is best
for patients, and only after I have exercised that professional judgment,
will I discuss the risks and benefits of the recommended treatment." This
story illustrates the emphasis doctors place on risk disclosures rather than
alternatives. The latter, however, is more crucial to joint decisionmaking
than the former. Such a view, however, again encounters the issue of
disclosure of medical uncertainty inherent in any forthright discussion of
treatment alternatives. Physicians remain most reluctant to acknowledge
uncertainty to themselves, and even more to their patients.
V. RESPECr FOR AUTONOMY
It should be evident by now that physicians must embark on a pro-
longed period of self-examination about how to interact with patients in
new ways in an age of medical science and informed consent. Physicians
must cease to complain about lawyers forcing them "to do silly things."
Whenever doctors do so, they often observe that they can easily present
their disclosures in ways that lead patients to agree with what they had
thought to be the best alternative in the first place. This contention is a
correct assessment of what transpires in customary practices that con-
tinue to eschew joint decisionmaking. Therefore, as I have already sug-
gested, informed consent in today's world, is largely a charade which
misleads patients into thinking that they are making decisions when in-
deed they are not.
41. James F. Childress, The Place of Autonomy in Bioethics, HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
Jan.-Feb. 1990, at 12, 12-13.
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Any meaningful change in Hippocratic decisionmaking practices first
requires a new and revolutionary commitment to one principle: that phy-
sicians must respect patients as autonomous persons. The most crucial
reason for my placing such high value on autonomy and self-determina-
tion is because doing so safeguards, as nothing else can, the recognition
by the other that the person before him or her is as much a person as he
or she is. Beneficence can readily reduce persons to non-persons by "tak-
ing care of them" in all of the many not only caring, but also, non-caring
meanings of this phrase.
Before continuing, I must interject a few comments about my usage of
the concept of autonomy. The principle of autonomy has been subjected
to criticism because its invocation can so readily consign human beings to
abstract categories which defy reality. I wrote about this problem in my
book The Silent World of Doctor and Patient: "Abstract principles tend to
express generalizations about conduct that are ill-suited for application to
actual cases in which human capacities to exercise rights must be consid-
ered."42 Thus, I spoke instead about "psychological autonomy," to distin-
guish my conception of autonomy, for example, from that of Kant who
restricted it to individuals' capacities to reason without any reference to
their emotional life and their dependence on the external world. Instead,
I wanted to convey by psychological autonomy, or better by respect for
psychological autonomy, that human autonomy is fragile and that its opti-
mal exercise requires both physicians and patients to pay caring attention
to their capacities and incapacities for self-determination. In their inter-
actions with one another, they must therefore through obligatory conver-
sation, support and enhance their real, though precarious, endowment for
reflective thought.
My views on psychological autonomy have been criticized as reintro-
ducing paternalism into the physician-patient relationship. In particular,
critics have argued that my emphasis on the obligation of patients to par-
ticipate in such conversations constitutes an invasion of their privacy.
While the criticism has merit, without such an obligation, autonomy is
reduced to an abstraction that is inattentive to the psychological reality of
both the strength and fragility of the human mind.
My views have also been misunderstood to require a lengthy, even
"psychoanalytic," exploration of patients' minds. This was not my inten-
tion. I merely wished to suggest that it is possible to go to some length of
subjecting thoughts and contemplated actions to clarification through dia-
42. KATz, supra note 9, at 107.
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logue which, in turn, may lead to a better understanding of what is at
stake in the medical decisions to be made. Doing more is impossible and
doing that much may not persuade patients to choose a course of action
that is "in their best interests." But, as Justice Stevens once put it, "[Ilt is
far better to permit some individuals to make incorrect decisions than to
deny all individuals the right to make decisions that have a profound ef-
fect upon their destiny."43
in such conversations the principle of beneficence, often invoked as a
counterpoise to autonomy, finds its rightful but delimited expression. Be-
neficence, in my view, requires physicians to enhance patients' capacities
to arrive at the best autonomous choices they are capable of making by
clearly and respectfully providing them with the information they need.
The inherent tensions between the two principles, therefore, must be re-
solved, as I have already suggested, by giving primacy to autonomy. My
reasons are twofold: (1) Autonomy assures that ultimate authority about
treatment decisions resides with patients including the decision to au-
thorize doctors to decide for them. Since it is their bodily integrity that is
at stake, no one but they can decide what should be done for them. (2)
In the past, beneficence has served too unquestionably as justification for
the unilateral exercise of physicians' authority to make decisions on be-
half of patients. Although in rare circumstances it may trump autonomy,
beneficence should only ensure that physicians will caringly assist patients
to make their own choices, informed by the clarification physicians can
provide about the medical consequences of the available options, particu-
larly, of course, the consequences of patients' preferences for an option
with which their doctors disagree.
Adherence to the principle of autonomy, in the ways I have defined it,
demands that physicians respect patients' autonomy as choice-making in-
dividuals, and that their ultimate choices (except under the rarest and
most carefully defined circumstances) be honored. It is based on the as-
sumption that many patients are capable of comprehending what they
need to know in order to decide what is best for themselves and that,
therefore, they must be treated as adults possessed of the capacity for
self-determination.
It is beyond the scope of this essay to explore decisionmaking between
physicians and patients incompetent by virtue of severe mental illness,
brain damage, or age. Throughout, I have limited my inquiry to doctors'
43. Thornburgh v. Am. College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 781
(1986).
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interactions with competent patients often considered "incompetent". by
doctors for reasons set forth above. To be sure, decisions by patients, like
those of all human beings, are influenced by rational and irrational
thoughts, rational and irrational emotions and rational and irrational
judgments derived from the world of knowledge, experience and beliefs
in which they have lived their lives. Respect for patient autonomy only
postulates that patients, like human beings generally, have considerable
capacity to listen, learn and reflect; that they can and must learn a great
deal from doctors about the world of medicine as it affects their disease
and dis-ease; and that they can choose and act better on their own behalf
than doctors can act for them.
VI. THE CURRENT STATE OF PHYSICIAN-PATIENT DECISIONMAKING
In his recent book, entitled How We Die, Sherwin Nuland, a distin-
guished surgeon, reflects with profundity and insight on his lifelong inter-
actions with patients. In a chapter on cancer and its treatment he speaks
movingly about "death belong[ing] to the dying and to those who love
them."44 Yet, that privilege is often wrested from them when,
[d]ecisions about continuation of treatment are influenced by
the enthusiasm of the doctors who propose them. Commonly,
the most accomplished of the specialists are also the most con-
vinced and unyielding believers in biomedicine's ability to over-
come the challenge presented by a pathological process ...
[W]hat is offered as objective clinical reality is often the subjec-
tivity of a devout disciple of the philosophy that death is an im-
placable enemy. To such warriors, even a temporary victory
justifies the laying waste of the fields in which a dying man has
cultivated his life.
45
Looking back at his work, he concludes that "more than a few of my
victories have been Pyrrhic. The suffering was sometimes not worth the
success .... [H]ad I been able to project myself into the place of the
family and the patient, I would have been less often certain that the des-
perate struggle should be undertaken."46
In his view, a surgeon,
[t]hough he be kind and considerate of the patient he treats...
allows himself to push his kindness aside because the seduction
of The Riddle [the quest for diagnosis and cure] is so strong and
44. SHERWIN B. NULAND, How WE DIE 265 (1994).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 266.
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the failure to solve it renders him so weak. [Thus, at times he
convinces] patients to undergo diagnostic or therapeutic meas-
ures at a point in illness so far beyond reason that The Riddle
might better have remained unsolved.47
Speaking then about the kind of doctor he will seek out when afflicted
with a major illness, Nuland does not expect him to "understand my val-
ues, my expectations for myself ... my philosophy of life. That is not
what he is trained for and that is not what he will be good at."4 Doctors
can impart information, but "[it behooves every patient to study his or
her own disease and learn enough about it. [Patients] should no longer
expect from so many of our doctors what they cannot give."
49
Nuland's views, supported by a great many poignant clinical vignettes,
sensitively and forthrightly describe the current state of physician-patient
decisionmaking, so dominated by physicians' judgments as to what is
best. He presents many reasons for this state of affairs. One is based on
doctors' "fear of failure:"
A need to control that exceeds in magnitude what most people
would find reasonable. When control is lost, he who requires it
is also a bit lost and so deals badly with the consequences of his
impotence. In an attempt to maintain control, a doctor, usually
without being aware of it, convinces himself that he knows bet-
ter than the patient what course is proper. He dispenses only as
much information as he deems fit, thereby influencing a pa-
tient's decision-making in ways he does not recognize as self-
50serving.
I have presented Nuland's observations at some length because they
illustrate and support my contentions that joint decisionmaking between
doctors and patients still eludes us. My critics had claimed earlier that my
work on informed consent was dated because informed consent had be-
come an integral aspect of the practice of medicine. In the paperback
edition of The Silent World of Doctor and Patient, I argued that they have
dismissed too lightly my central arguments:
[T]hat meaningful collaboration between physicians and pa-
tients cannot become a reality until physicians have learned (1)
how to treat their patients not as children but as the adults they
are; (2) how to distinguish between their ideas of the best treat-
ment and their patients' ideas of what is best; (3) how to ac-
47. Id. at 249.
48. Id. at 266 (emphasis added).
49. Id. at 260.
50. Id. at 258.
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knowledge to their patients (and often to themselves as well)
their ignorance and uncertainties about diagnosis, treatment,
and prognosis; [and to all this, I now want to add, (4) how to
explain to patients the uncertainties inherent in the state of the
art and science of medicine which otherwise permits doctors on
the basis of their clinical experience to leave unacknowledged
that their colleagues on the basis of their clinical experience
have different beliefs as to which treatment is best].
51
Nuland pleads for the resurrection of the family doctor52 because he
believes that the specialist is inadequate to the task of shouldering the
burdens of decision with his patients. About this I differ with him. I
believe that physicians (and surgeons as well) can, and must, learn to con-
verse with patients in the spirit of joint decisionmaking. Physicians can
and must learn to appreciate better than they do now that the principle of
respect for person speaks to the caring commitment of physicians in old
and new ways: Old in that it highlights the ancient and venerable medical
duty not to abandon patients, and new by requiring doctors to communi-
cate with them and remain at their sides, not only while their bodies are
racked with pain and suffering but also while their minds are beset by
fear, confusion, doubt and suffering over decisions to be made; also new
in that implementation of the principle of psychological autonomy im-
poses the obligations on physicians both to invite, and respond to, ques-
tions about the decisions to be made, and to do so by respecting patients'
ultimate choices, a new aspect of the duty to care.
The moral authority of physicians will not be undermined by this caring
view of interacting with patients. Doctors' authority resides in the medi-
cal knowledge they possess, in their capacity to diagnose and treat, in
their ability to evaluate what can be diagnosed and what cannot, what is
treatable and what is not, and what treatment alternatives to recommend,
each with its own risks and benefits and each with its own prognostic
implications as to cure, control, morbidity, exacerbation or even death.
The moral authority of physicians resides in knowing better than others
the certainties and the uncertainties that accompany diagnosis, treatment,
prognosis, health and disease, as well the extent and the limits of their
scientific knowledge and scientific ignorance. Physicians must learn to
face up to and acknowledge the tragic limitations of their own profes-
sional knowledge, their inability to impart all their insights to all patients,
and their own personal incapacities - at times more pronounced than
51. JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT Xi (1986).
52. NULAND, supra note 44, at 266.
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others - to devote themselves fully to the needs of their patients. They
must learn not to be unduly embarrassed by their personal and profes-
sional ignorance and to trust their patients to react appropriately to such
acknowledgment. From all this it follows that ultimately the moral au-
thority of physicians resides in their capacity to sort out with .patients the
choices to be made.
It is in this spirit that duty and caring become interwoven. Bringing
these strands together imposes upon physicians the duty to respect pa-
tients as persons so that care will encompass allowing patients to live
their lives in their own self-willed ways. To let patients follow their own
lights is not an abandonment of them. It is a professional duty that, how-
ever painful, doctors must obey.
Without fidelity to these new professional duties, true caring will elude
physicians. There is much new to be learned about caring that in decades
to come will constitute the kind of caring that doctors in the past have
wished for but have been unable to dispense, and that patients may have
always yearned for.
I do not know whether my vision of a new physician-patient relation-
ship defies medical reality. Thus, I may be wrong and I am willing to
entertain this possibility as long as my critics are willing to admit that they
too may be wrong. As a profession we have never examined and tested in
a committed manner what I have proposed. It is this fact which, in conclu-
sion, I want to highlight. For, I believe that in this age of medical science
and informed consent the category of patient is in need of a radical recon-
ceptualization. Throughout medical history, patients have been viewed as
passive, ignorant persons whose welfare was best protected by their fol-
lowing doctors' orders, and physicians and patients were socialized to in-
teract with one another on that basis. Throughout this essay, I have
argued that such a view of the physician-patient relationship was dictated
by doctors' inability to explain to themselves what was therapeutic and
what was not in the practice of medicine. The advent of the age of medi-
cal science has changed all that and for the first time in medical history
doctors now can distinguish better between knowledge, ignorance and
conjecture. In turn, this permits physicians to take patients into their
confidence.
Finally, my purpose in writing this essay is twofold: (1) To argue,
notwithstanding any theories of tort law and cost containment to the con-
trary,53 that patients must ultimately be given the deciding vote in matters
53. See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899 (1994).
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that effect their lives; and (2) to suggest that informed consent will re-
main a fairy tale as long as the idea of joint decisionmaking, based on a
commitment to patient autonomy and self-determination, does not be-
come an integral aspect of the ethos of medicine and the law of informed
consent. Until then, physicians, patients and judges can only deceive
themselves or be deceived about patients having a vital voice in the medi-
cal decisionmaking process. Of course, there are alternatives to joint
decisionmaking. One that I have briefly explored elsewhere suggested
that we need a number of informed (and uninformed) consent doctrines
depending on the nature of the decisions to be made, with the implication
that only in certain medical contexts must informed consent rise to the
rigor advanced in this essay.54 Another alternative is to fashion an in-
formed consent doctrine for law and medicine that is not based on "[tihe
root premise ... fundamental in American jurisprudence, that '[e]very
human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what
shall be done with his own body."'5 5 It is not a road on which I would
like to travel and thus, I leave that task to others. It is important that
those who disagree with me set forth their premises about who decides
what; otherwise physicians and patients are condemned to interact with
one another, under the rubric of what is now called "informed consent,"
by deception of both self and the other.
54. Jay Katz, Physician-Patient Encounters "On a Darkling Plain," 9 W. NEw ENG. L.
REV. 207, 221-22 (1987).
55. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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